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Who Decides? The Title IX Religious 
Exemption and Administrative Authority 
The Title IX religious exemption demonstrates how statutory 
religious exemptions can help further social change by neutralizing 
potential conflict with religious dissenters. Part of the reason for its 
success is that it is narrowly constructed and automatically applies to 
qualifying institutions. However, the regulations contradict the 
statutory text by potentially giving the Department of Education 
discretion to grant or deny exemptions. Were the Department to fully 
exercise this power, its actions would conflict with both the language of 
the statute and the Constitution. The Department of Education’s recent 
scrutiny of the “controlled by” language of the exemption provides an 
example of the hazards of allowing the Department to grant or 
deny exemptions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past several years, statutory religious exemptions have 
come under fire as attempts to hinder social progress.1 However, 
rather than an attempt to “allow . . . discrimination,”2 Professor Carl 
Esbeck has noted that “a statutory religious exemption is understood 
by the Supreme Court as a case of Congress choosing to ‘leave 
religion alone.’”3 Thus, the aim of religious exemptions is to 
neutralize potential conflicts between government actions and the 
requirements of a religious conscience. In addition, statutory 
exemptions “are much more majoritarian” because they provide 
protections not only for religious majorities but also for religious 
minorities whose objections may not have been contemplated by 
lawmakers.4 So, religious exemptions have two great benefits: they 
protect religious exercise, including for religious minorities, while 
still facilitating social change. 
Indeed, one of the reasons why a religious exemption is effective 
is “because it gives institutions deeply opposed to [change] a less 
draconian option than shutting down entirely.”5 Professor Robin 
Fretwell Wilson argues that specific statutory exemptions “can 
smooth the way for the realization of new civil rights.”6 As an 
example of the effectiveness of statutory religious exemptions, 
Professor Wilson cites the Church Amendment, which “advanced 
 
 1.  See Ed O’Keefe, Gay Rights Groups Withdraw Support of ENDA After Hobby 
Lobby Decision, WASH. POST (July 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
politics/wp/2014/07/08/gay-rights-group-withdrawing-support-of-enda-after-hobby-lobby-
decision/; John M. Donnelly, Exclusive: Obama Would Veto Defense Bill Over Discrimination 
Issue, ROLL CALL (Oct. 26, 2016, 1:46 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/policy
/exclusive-obama-veto-defense-bill-discrimination-issue. 
 2.  Donnelly, supra note 1. 
 3.  Carl H. Esbeck, Federal Contractors, Title VII, and LGBT Employment 
Discrimination: Can Religious Organizations Continue to Staff on a Religious Basis?, 4 
OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 368, 378 (2015). 
 4. Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from Social Change: 
What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific Exemptions, 48 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 703, 720 (2014). 
 5.  Id. at 714. 
 6.  Id. at 715. 
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abortion rights in a concrete, material way.”7 Under this 
amendment, those who objected to abortions for reasons of 
conscience—including the hundreds of religious hospitals 
throughout the country that were faced with the possibility of 
shutting down after Roe v. Wade—were not required to perform 
them.8 After the Church Amendment was passed and signed into law 
in 1973, there was an immediate increase in access to abortion 
providers, including a fifty percent increase in the number of doctors 
performing abortions in their offices.9 Thus, Congress’s compromise 
allowed for both increased access to abortion providers and 
accommodations for religious dissenters. 
Just as modern religious exemptions provide accommodations 
for religious dissenters, the earliest American religious exemptions 
provided protection against discrimination of religious dissenters. As 
early as 1669, the charter of the Carolina colony allowed for an 
exemption from oath taking.10 In 1673, Rhode Island allowed for 
exemptions from military service for conscientious objectors.11 This 
was a remarkably liberal step in a time when Europe was roiled with 
religious warfare to stamp out dissenters rather than accommodate 
them.12 The Constitution also allows exemptions from oath taking in 
four separate places, “matter-of-factly and without controversy.”13 
First Amendment scholar Professor Doug Laycock notes that these 
exemptions were enacted based on the belief that “religious 
dissenters should be free to live in a jurisdiction and that their lives 
should not be made miserable because of their faith.”14 Professor 
Laycock further notes that “[o]nce a jurisdiction came around to this 
view, it quickly became apparent that toleration must apply not just 
to belief, but also to religious speech and worship, and to important 
 
 7.  Id. at 778. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 779–80; see also id. at 715 (“[T]he Church Amendment prompted a 50% 
increase in the number of physicians performing abortions in their offices within months of 
its enactment.”). 
 10.  Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original 
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1804 (2006). 
 11.  Id. at 1806–08. 
 12.  See id. at 1798–1803. 
 13.  Id. at 1805. 
 14.  Id. at 1804. 
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religious conduct.”15 Thus, the earliest religious exemptions 
protected both the beliefs and practices of religious individuals, even 
for controversial issues such as military service. 
Since the Founding, there have been at least two schools of 
thought regarding the appropriate scope of religious liberty, 
including religious exemptions. The Jeffersonian view, popularized 
by his famous letter to the Danbury Baptists calling for a “wall of 
separation” between church and state, advocates for broad 
protections of religious beliefs but limited protections for religious 
conduct.16 Protecting beliefs but not conduct has limited efficacy 
because it means that if a government policy and religious practice 
conflict, the religious practice loses. This has particularly negative 
consequences for religious minorities, whose practices might not 
always be considered by those in power. Indeed, Professor Michael 
McConnell noted that Jefferson’s idea of a distinction between 
government protection for beliefs and government protection for 
conduct was outdated and “placed him at least a century behind the 
argument for full freedom of religious exercise in America.”17 
Religious exercise, as opposed to just religious belief, was a primary 
concern for Madison, who advocated a more liberal view of religious 
exercise. After witnessing “5 or 6 well meaning [sic] men” 
imprisoned “for publishing their religious Sentiments which in the 
main are very orthodox,” he became a passionate defender of 
religious liberty, particularly for religious dissenters.18 Although 
Madison “advocated a jurisdictional division between religion and 
government,” he believed those boundaries should be defined 
“based on the demands of religion rather than solely on the interests 
of society.”19 As Madison famously wrote in his Memorial and 
Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, duty to religion is 
“precedent both in order of time and degree of obligation, to the 
 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise 
of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1451 (1990) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
a Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1820), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 281–82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1904)). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to William Bradford (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 104 (Robert C. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977)). 
 19.  Id. at 1453. 
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claims of Civil Society.”20 Thus, in Madison’s view, protecting 
religious liberty meant ensuring, as often as possible, that religious 
individuals were not forced to choose between two sovereigns—civil 
government or religious obligation. 
An example of a liberal, Madisonian religious exemption in our 
time is the Title IX religious exemption, which has both 
accommodated religious exercise and promoted social change. For 
example, within twenty years of the enactment of Title IX in 1972, 
the percentage of females ages twenty to twenty-four enrolled in 
school almost doubled, from about fifteen percent to about twenty-
nine percent.21 Currently, more than half of students enrolled in 
undergraduate institutions of higher education are female.22 
Although other social, economic, and political factors have 
influenced this increase, scholars acknowledge the foundational role 
Title IX played in increasing women’s access to higher education.23 
The inclusion of a religious exemption in Title IX has allowed 
religious institutions of higher education, which have a long and 
valuable history in the United States,24 to continue to adhere to their 
religious beliefs and practices while still promoting gender equality.  
One of the reasons why the Title IX religious exemption has 
successfully protected both gender equality in education and 
 
 20.  Letter from James Madison to The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia (June 20, 1785), in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland 
et al. eds., 1973) (an anonymous petition sent by James Madison to the legislature entitled “A 
Memorial and Remonstrance”).  
 21.  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 120 YEARS OF 
AMERICAN EDUCATION: A STATISTICAL PORTRAIT 16–17 (Thomas D. Snyder ed., 1993). 
 22.  Kurt Bauman & Camille Ryan, Women Now at the Head of the Class, Lead Men in 
College Attainment, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: RANDOM SAMPLINGS (Oct. 7, 2015), https:// 
www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings/2015/10/women-now-at-the-head-of 
-the-class-lead-men-in-college-attainment.html.  
 23.  See, e.g., Katherine Hanson, Susan J. Smith & Ambika Kapur, Does “All” Mean 
“All?”: Education for Girls and Women, WOMEN’S STUD. Q., Fall-Winter 2000, at 249, 250 
(“Since the fight for passage of Title IX . . . girls and women in general have had more 
opportunities than all previous generations.”). 
 24.  It is worth noting that religious institutions of higher education have played a vital 
role in American higher education. In addition to historical examples such as Harvard College, 
which was established as a school to train clergy, there are at least 7000 religiously affiliated 
colleges and universities in the United States. The History Behind Harvard University, BEST C. 
REVIEWS, http://www.bestcollegereviews.org/history-behind-harvard-university/ (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2018); see also Religious Schools in the US, INTERNATIONALSTUDENT.COM, https:// 
www.internationalstudent.com/study_usa/religious-schools/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
4.FAUST_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:47 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1202 
religious educational institutions is that the exemption, as written, is 
narrowly constructed and automatically applies to qualifying 
institutions.25 The Department of Education has historically enforced 
the exemption in this manner, which has contributed to Title IX’s 
success.26 However, the regulations contradict the statutory text by 
creating a regulatory procedure that gives the Department discretion 
to grant or deny exemptions.27 Were the Department to fully exercise 
this power, its actions would conflict with both the language of the 
statute and the Constitution.28 The Department of Education’s 
recent scrutiny of the “controlled by” language of the exemption 
provides an example of the hazards of allowing the Department to 
grant or deny exemptions.29  
This Comment argues that the Title IX religious exemption 
should be applied automatically, as written, instead of allowing the 
Department of Education to grant exemptions. Part II discusses the 
text and history of Title IX, focusing on the language enacted by 
Congress. Part III explores the conflict created by the regulations 
and argues that the religious exemption should be automatic for 
qualifying institutions. Part IV provides a recent example of the 
troublesome inconsistency that can result from allowing the 
Department of Education to grant exemptions. Part V concludes. 
II. HISTORY AND TEXT OF TITLE IX 
A. Passing Title IX: The Education Amendments of 1971 and 1972 
Although little legislative history on the Title IX religious 
exemption is available, the legislative history on Title IX’s 
nondiscrimination provision indicates that the bill had widespread 
support.30 However, when what is now known as Title IX was first 
introduced in 1971, it was unsuccessful. Senator Birch Evans Bayh 
(D-IN), Title IX’s primary sponsor in the Senate, advocated to 
expand the Education Amendments to include equal access to 
 
 25.  See infra Part II. 
 26.  See infra Part III. 
 27.  See infra Part III. 
 28.  See infra Part III. 
 29.  See infra Part IV. 
 30.  See 117 CONG. REC. 29339 (1971). 
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education for women as well as the impoverished, their original 
objective.31 After little debate, the amendment was rejected as 
not germane.32 
The next year, Senator Bayh successfully included sex as part of 
the Education Amendments of 1972.33 Reading from an 
independent report on discrimination in higher education during a 
floor debate, Senator Bayh noted that “[d]iscrimination against 
women, in contrast to that against minorities, is still overt and 
socially acceptable within the academic community. The only 
antidote is a comprehensive amendment such as the one now before 
the Senate.”34 The amendment easily passed the Senate on March 1, 
1972, with an eighty-eight to six vote.35 
As Senator Bayh had done in the Senate, Congresswoman Green 
(D-OR), in the House, “made sure that her colleagues knew that the 
only thing which Title IX does is add the word ‘sex’ to existing 
law,”36 thereby extending nondiscrimination protections to women 
in education. In the end, Title IX also passed with widespread 
support in the House, 332 to thirty-eight.37  
The exemptions to Title IX, including the religious exemption, 
were added as a compromise in the conference committee between 
the House and the Senate.38 The House version of Title IX included 
the Erlenborn Amendment, which exempted all undergraduate 
institutions from Title IX.39 In conference, the House was willing to 
let go of the Erlenborn Amendment, and in exchange, the Senate  
 
 
 
 
 
 31.  Paul C. Sweeney, Abuse Misuse & Abrogation of the Use of Legislative History: Title 
IX & Peer Sexual Harassment, 66 UMKC L. REV. 41, 60 (1997). 
 32.  Id. at 61. 
 33.  See id. at 61–63. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Voting Record of Proposed Omnibus Education Amendments of 1972, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/92-1972/s496 (last visited Jan. 
4, 2018). 
 36.  Sweeney, supra note 31, at 66. 
 37.  Id. at 67. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
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agreed to a series of exemptions to military institutions, traditionally 
single-sex institutions, and religious institutions.40 
President Nixon signed Title IX into law on June 23, 1972.41 
B. Statutory Language 
Especially given the sparse legislative history, the best indication 
of Congress’s intent in passing the Title IX religious exemption is 
the statutory language. In comparison with other religious 
exemptions to federal civil rights laws, the Title IX religious 
exemption is narrowly constructed. The exemption reads that the 
nondiscrimination provisions of Title IX “shall not apply to an 
educational institution which is controlled by a religious 
organization if the application of this subsection would not be 
consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.”42 This 
language is narrower than the religious exemption to Title VII, for 
example, which applies to any “educational institution . . . with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to 
perform work connected with the carrying on by such . . . 
educational institution[s].”43 Where the Title VII exemption applies 
to a wide range of religious organizations, the Title IX religious 
exemption applies only to “educational institution[s] controlled by a 
religious organization.”44  
Also unlike Title VII, which has institution-wide application for 
employment,45 the Title IX religious exemption narrowly applies only 
to the extent that Title IX is not “consistent with the religious 
 
 40.  Id. By statute, Title IX includes nine categories for exemptions: (1) institutions that 
are not “institutions of vocational education, professional education, and graduate higher 
education, and to public institutions of undergraduate higher education”; (2) institutions that 
were transitioning from being single sex to coeducational institutions within six years of the 
law’s enactment; (3) educational institutions of religious organizations with contrary religious 
tenets; (4) educational institutions training for the military or merchant marine; (5) 
traditionally single sex undergraduate institutions; (6) social fraternities or sororities and 
voluntary youth service organizations, like Girl Scouts; (7) boy or girl conferences, such as the 
Boys State Conference; (8) father-son or mother-daughter activities; and (9) scholarship 
awards in beauty pageants. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9) (2012). 
 41.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 
 42.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3). 
 43.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012). 
 44.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (emphasis added); see also infra Section II.C. 
 45.  See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
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tenets” of the organization. Thus, exemptions from Title IX are 
program-specific; no institution receiving federal assistance can 
receive a blanket exemption from Title IX. For example, a women’s 
college is exempt from Title IX in its admissions, but it cannot be 
exempt from Title IX’s requirement to address sexual violence.46 
Similarly, an institution may receive a religious exemption to require 
its students to abstain from extramarital sex, but that institution 
would still be required to follow Title IX in admissions.47 
Far from being a get-out-of-gender-equality-free card, the Title 
IX religious exemption is narrowly drafted to protect the religious 
beliefs and practices of educational institutions while still requiring 
religious institutions to promote gender equality. 
C. “Controlled By” 
Unlike other religious exemptions, the Title IX religious 
exemption applies to educational institutions that are “controlled by 
a religious organization.”48 Although not a major consideration for 
much of the history of Title IX, this language recently received 
scrutiny from the Department of Education.49 Although not an 
indication of Congress’s intent when it passed the Title IX religious 
exemption in 1972, a failed amendment to the Senate version50 of 
the contemplated Civil Rights Restoration Act of 198751 illustrates 
the scope of the “controlled by” language of Title IX’s 
religious exemption.  
In a debate on the bill, which sought to “restore the broad scope 
of coverage and to clarify the application of Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972,”52 Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) proposed an 
amendment to modify the religious exemption. His amendment 
sought to change the language of the Title IX religious exemption to 
include schools that are “closely identified with the tenets of” a 
 
 46. Know Your Rights: Title IX Requires Your School to Address Sexual Violence, U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/know-rights-201404-
title-ix.pdf (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
 47.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3). 
 48.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3). 
 49.  See infra Part III. 
 50.  S. 557, 100th Cong. (1988). 
 51.  Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
 52.  134 CONG. REC. 330 (1988) (statement of assistant legislative clerk). 
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religious organization.53 Senator Hatch argued that the amendment 
was important because he believed very few universities would fit 
within a strict construction of the “controlled by” language.54 By his 
estimation, the only two universities that would be exempt from 
Title IX under the “controlled by” language were Brigham Young 
University and Catholic University.55 
The senators who opposed the amendment did so because they 
believed the existing exemption language was sufficient. Several 
senators expressed concern that changing the language would extend 
the exemption too far and could potentially derail the success of the 
bill.56 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) argued that the 
exemption’s “controlled by” language “basically addresses the 
central concerns” raised by the amendment.57 He also argued that 
the proposed language would be over-inclusive, as it could apply to 
as many as one-quarter of all American institutions of higher 
education.58 Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT) warned that, “all sorts 
of untold mischief would occur as to title [sic] IX were the 
amendment to be adopted,” including that “anybody that is in 
contradiction to the civil rights laws of this Nation is all of a sudden 
going to find themselves closely identified with one faith or 
another.”59 Similarly, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) commented that 
the proposed language was “too vague.”60 The amendment failed in 
a thirty-nine to fifty-six vote.61 
 
53.   Id. (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Supreme Court held that (1) if students 
received federal financial assistance, the school was deemed as receiving federal financial 
assistance for the purposes of Title IX, even though the assistance was indirect; and (2) that 
Title IX coverage was program-specific rather than institution-wide. Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 
465 U.S. 555, 564–74 (1984), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), as recognized in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. 
Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999). Congress interpreted this case as limiting Title IX and enacted 
the Civil Rights Restoration Act to clarify that Title IX was to be applied on an institution-
wide rather than program-specific basis. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 
100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). 
 57.  134 CONG. REC. 334 (1988). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. at 335. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 336. 
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The debate on the Hatch Amendment suggests the idea that the 
language of Title IX religious exemption is neither too narrow 
(covering only two universities) nor too broad (covering one-quarter 
of all American colleges and universities). At the time of the debate, 
the Department of Education had recognized 150 religious 
exemptions to Title IX and had closed seventy-nine files 
for a variety of reasons, including, but not limited to: the 
institution withdrew the request; the institution did not need a 
religious exemption since its admission practices were 
already  exempt; the institution had ceased operations; or 
the  institution  failed to respond to repeated requests . . . for 
additional  information.62  
Senator Kennedy also noted that, as of the debate, the Department 
of Education had “never denied a request for religious exemption.”63 
This trend would continue for almost three decades—a review of 
exemption requests indicates that as of December 31, 2016, the 
Department of Education had yet to deny such a request.64 
III. CLAIMING THE RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION 
According to the language of the statute, qualifying institutions 
are automatically exempt from the requirements of Title IX to the 
extent that they conflict with the institutions’ religious tenets.65 
However, the regulations enacting the religious exemption conflict 
with the statutory text, creating ambiguity.66 Although the 
Department of Education’s internal guidelines acknowledge the 
limitations on its authority in administering the religious exemption, 
 
 62.  Id at 334. After this debate, the Department of Education began processing and 
responding to exemption letters to clear the backlog. See Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious 
Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327, 362–78 (2016). 
 63.  134 CONG. REC. 334 (1988). 
 64.  See Religious Exemptions Index Prior to 2009, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https:// 
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/z-index-links-list-pre-2009.html 
(last updated May 3, 2016) [hereinafter Religious Exemptions Index Prior to 2009]; see also 
Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/z-index-links-list-2009-2016.html (last updated Dec. 
2017) [hereinafter Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016]. 
 65.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2012). 
 66.  34 C.F.R. § 106.12(a) (2017). 
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the Department of Education (originally part of the Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare) has used the regulations to expand 
its authority by creating procedures that conflict with the statutory 
text.67 In addition, the Department has used language in its 
correspondence with schools that asserts its authority.68 Not only do 
these procedures violate the automatic nature of the text as agreed 
upon by congressional compromise, they also present First 
Amendment concerns. Because the statutory language 
unambiguously grants exemption for qualifying educational 
institutions, and to avoid constitutional concerns,69 the regulations 
should be read as a courtesy rather than a mandate. 
A. Conflict Between the Statutory and Regulatory Language 
 Title IX’s implementing regulations conflict with its statutory 
text by requiring a procedure for exemption. According to the 
language of the statute, “this section shall not apply to an educational 
institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the 
application of this subsection would not be consistent with the 
religious tenets of such organization.”70 The “shall not apply” 
language indicates that qualifying organizations are automatically 
exempt and that no procedure is necessary for the institution to 
claim exemption. Additionally, the direct “shall not apply” language 
precludes the idea that the exemption is granted by any authority 
other than the statute. Subsection (a) of the regulation is in 
accordance with this principle, although it slightly modifies the 
statute’s “shall not apply” language to say that “[t]his part does not 
apply” to qualifying institutions.71 As it does in the statute, this 
regulatory language indicates that the exemption is automatic.  
Despite these initial similarities, the regulation conflicts with the 
 
 67.  See infra Section III.C. 
 68.  See infra Section III.A. 
 69.  See NLRB. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 (1979) (“Accordingly, in 
the absence of a clear expression of Congress’ intent to bring [activities of] church-operated 
schools within the jurisdiction of the Board, we decline to construe the Act in a manner that 
could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the 
guarantees of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.”). 
 70.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
 71.  34 C.F.R. § 106.12(a) (emphasis added). 
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language of the statute by instituting procedures not required by 
Congress. In subsection (b), it sets forth a procedure for “[a]n 
educational institution which wishes to claim the exemption.”72 This 
contradicts the automatic nature of both the statutory exemption 
and subsection (a) of the regulation by asserting that an institution is 
not automatically exempt, but must “claim” the exemption. The 
procedure of subsection (b) requires that institutions “shall [claim 
the exemption] by submitting in writing to the Assistant Secretary a 
statement by the highest ranking official of the institution, 
identifying the provisions . . . which conflict with a specific tenet of 
the religious organization.”73 The regulation does not give any 
indication as to how, if at all, the Department is required to respond 
to these letters, nor does it say that the Department is responsible for 
“granting” exemptions.  
A federal district court in Tennessee acknowledged the conflict 
between the statute and its enacting regulations in Hall v. Lee 
College, though it did not resolve the issue.74 In one of the few cases 
to address the Title IX religious exemption directly,75 a student at 
Lee College, “a small private college located in Cleveland, 
Tennessee . . . affiliated with the Church of God,” brought a Title IX 
claim after she was suspended because she was “pregnant and . . . 
unmarried.”76 The court held that there was insufficient evidence to 
sustain the plaintiff ’s claim and dismissed the case with prejudice.77 
Acknowledging that it did not need to resolve the question of 
whether the religious college was exempt, the court, nonetheless, 
noted that 
it is not clear that the procedure for claiming the exemption 
contained in the regulation applies to the exemption contained in 
the statute. Section 106.12(b) [of the regulation] clearly refers to 
 
 72.  Id. § 106.12(b). 
 73.  Id. While the initial draft of the regulation allowed the Department of Education to 
determine whether the institution qualifies from exemption, that language was omitted from 
the final draft. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 62, at 333. 
 74.  See generally Hall v. Lee Coll., Inc. 932 F. Supp. 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). 
 75.  See generally Amanda Bryk, Title IX Giveth and the Religious Exemption Taketh 
Away: How the Religious Exemption Eviscerates the Protection Afforded Transgender Students 
Under Title IX, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 751, 778–79 (2015). 
 76.  Hall, 932 F. Supp. at 1029–30. 
 77.  Id. at 1033. 
4.FAUST_FIN.NO HEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/12/2018  10:47 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
1210 
the exemption from the regulations set forth in section 106.12(a). 
It may very well be that to claim the exemption found in the 
statute, an educational institution need do nothing more than just 
raise the exemption.78 
Because the regulations conflict with the language of the statute, 
there was significant pushback from the United States Catholic 
Conference and the American Association of Presidents of 
Independent Colleges and Universities when the implementing 
regulations for Title IX were being reviewed.79 The director and 
secretary of the American Association of Presidents of Independent 
Colleges and Universities, Dallin Oaks, testified at congressional 
hearings opposing the procedure of claiming an exemption by letter 
as “demeaning and inconsistent with the Federal Constitution.”80 
Oaks’s concern was that government administrators would become 
arbiters of whether the regulation was in violation of a religious 
tenet,81 thus anticipating that the Department of Education would 
see itself as the authority in granting exemptions rather than 
acknowledging an automatic exemption under the statute or, as Oaks 
argued, the Constitution. 
B. History of Ambiguity in Interpretation 
At the time the regulations were under review, Oaks was also 
President of Brigham Young University (BYU), a private university 
owned and operated by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints. Once the regulations were finalized, President Oaks wrote a 
letter in compliance with subsection (b), despite his opposition to 
the procedure.82 In the letter, he said BYU did “not concede that the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare has the power to 
review our claim of exemption on the ground of religion,” and that 
he was notifying the Department of BYU’s exemption rather than 
requesting exemption.83 In addition to writing the letter, BYU took 
out advertisements in its campus newspaper and other local 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Augustine-Adams, supra note 62, at 334. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. at 338. 
 83.  Id. 
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newspapers, of its own policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of 
sex.84 Although President Oaks complied with the requirements of 
the regulation, he did not cede authority to the Department. 
After considerable negotiations between President Oaks and the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, including a campus 
visit by department officials, the Office for Civil Rights issued a letter 
to Brigham Young University acknowledging its exemption.85 In the 
letter, Martin H. Gerry, the director for the Office for Civil Rights, 
wrote that the Department “ha[d] determined . . . that BYU is . . . 
eligible for an exemption” and that BYU “is granted an exemption 
from those requirements” that would conflict with its religious 
tenets.86 This language directly conflicted with President Oaks’s view 
of the department’s authority, which Director Gerry acknowledged.87 
However, he wrote that “because of the exemption granted herein 
and your agreement to comply with the regulations in all non-
exempt areas, I do not believe any purpose would be served by 
further pursuing our discussion of this matter at this time.”88 In 
other words, when faced squarely with the question of whether the 
Department grants exemptions or whether qualifying institutions are 
automatically exempt, the Department asserted its authority to grant 
exemptions in the language it used, but did not press the issue; BYU 
met the qualifications and was therefore exempt. 
C. Administrative Interpretations of the Exemption 
Despite the Department’s assertions to the contrary in its letter 
to President Oaks, some Department of Education documents admit 
that exemptions are automatic, not granted. The Smith memo—an 
internal memorandum for the Department of Education, written by 
William L. Smith, acting assistant secretary of the Office for Civil 
Rights, on October 11, 1989, which currently published on the 
 
 84.  Id. at 343. 
 85.  Letter from Martin H. Gerry, Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Dallin Oaks, President, Brigham Young Univ. (Aug. 12, 1976) (on file with Harold B. Lee 
Library Special Collections at Brigham Young University). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. (“As discussed during the meeting, we disagree as to the scope of authority 
provided by Title IX. In your view, the regulation exceeds the authority provided in 
the statute.”). 
 88.  Id. 
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Department of Education’s website—states that “[t]he regulation 
does not require that a religious institution submit a written claim of 
exemption, nor is an institution’s exempt status dependent upon its 
submission of a written statement.”89 Instead, the Smith 
memo  rightly interprets the letters as “request[s] for assurance” 
of exemptions.90 
1. The letter-writing procedure of subsection (b)91 
The Department of Education has generally implemented 
subsection (b) of the regulation, requiring the highest official of an 
institution to send a letter to the Department if it “wishes to claim” 
an exemption, in a purely supervisory rather than substantive 
 
 89.  Memorandum from William L. Smith, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, to 
Office for Civil Rights Senior Staff, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 1 (Oct. 11, 1989), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/smith-memo-19891011.pdf. The Smith 
Memo is the most recent of three memoranda published on the Department of Education’s 
website about exemptions to Title IX. See Exemptions from Title IX, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/index.html (last modified 
Oct. 23, 2017) [hereinafter Exemptions from Title IX]. 
 90.  Memorandum from William L. Smith, supra note 89.  
 91.  In May 2016, the Department of Education began publishing the letters 
mentioned in subsection (b), as well as its responses. See Religious Exemptions Index 2009–
2016, supra note 64. This list of letters has been referred to by some in the media as a “shame 
list.” Carly Hoilman, Department of Education Publishes ‘Shame List’ of Faith-Based Colleges 
Seeking Title IX Exemption from Transgender Anti-Discrimination Rules, BLAZE (May 1, 
2016, 7:42 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/05/01/u-s-department-of-educat 
ion-publishes-shame-list-of-faith-based-colleges-seeking-title-ix-exemption-from-transgender-a 
nti-discrimination-rules/. As the Department has issued new regulations and guidelines over 
the years, several institutions have submitted multiple letters. See Religious Exemptions Index 
2009–2016, supra note 64. Only three schools, Pepperdine University, Loyola New Orleans, 
and Kettering College requested to lose their exempt status and be taken off the “shame list,” 
with Pepperdine asserting that it had never activated its exemption from 1976 and had always 
complied with Title IX. See Letter from Andrew K. Benton, President & CEO, Pepperdine 
Univ., to Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC. (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-
exempt/pepperdine-university-request-01272016.pdf; Letter from Nate Brandstater, 
President, Kettering Coll. of Med. Arts, to Caroline Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, 
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (July 10, 2017), https:// www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/kettering-college-of-medical-arts-request-08182016.pdf; 
Letter from Kevin William Wildes, President, Loyola Univ. New Orleans, to Catherine E. 
Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (May 19, 
2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/loyola-university-
request-05192016.pdf. These published letters were invaluable in my research regarding the 
application of the religious exemption; however, it appears that no letters have been published 
since December 31, 2016. See Religious Exemption Index 2009–2016, supra note 64. 
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manner.92  For this reason, although the regulatory procedure of 
writing a letter technically adds to the statutory language of the Title 
IX religious exemption, the procedure has not interfered with the 
effective implementation of the statutory language of the 
religious exemption. 
When the Department of Education receives a letter from an 
educational institution in accordance with subsection (b), the 
Department either responds by acknowledging (or “granting”) the 
exemption or by requesting additional information. For example, 
Baptist Bible College and Seminary in Pennsylvania wrote a letter to 
claim its exemption after the Supreme Court’s decision in Grove City 
v. Bell.93 Baptist Bible College had previously submitted an 
exemption letter in 1976 that was “granted” by the Department in 
1985.94 The Department responded to Baptist Bible College’s 
renewed letter in November 1988 by requesting additional 
information regarding how the religious tenets of the controlling 
organization conflicted with Title IX: 
Although your request letter included general statements of 
religious tenets, and information regarding the Title IX 
regulation . . . regarding marital and parental status, it did not state 
the specific tenets or how they conflict with these sections of the 
regulation. If you wish the office to make a determination 
 
 92.  34 C.F.R. § 106.12(b) (2017). 
 93.  Letter from Milo E. Thompson, Jr., President, Baptist Bible Coll. & Seminary, to 
Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 17, 1988), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/baptist-bible-college-and-
seminary-request-10171988.pdf. 
 94.  Letter from Ernest Pickering, President, Baptist Bible Coll. & Sch. of Theology of 
Pa., to the Dir., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Dec. 9, 
1976), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/baptist-bible-colle 
ge-and-seminary-request-12091976.pdf; Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for 
Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Mark Jackson, President, Baptist Bible Coll. & Sch. 
of  Theology, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 18, 1985), https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/baptist-bible-college-and-seminary-response-06181985. 
pdf. Between 1976 and 1985, The Department of Education responded to very few of the 
exemption letters it received, perhaps out of the uncertainty regarding whether response was 
required. See Augustine-Adams, supra note 62, at 351–53. In 1985, the Secretary directed 
regional offices to clear the backlog of responses, resulting in many response letters being 
issued in that period. Id. at 361–66. 
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regarding a religious exemption in these areas, please provide the 
information requested and return it to this office.95 
Baptist Bible College responded in January of 1989 with extensive 
citations to the Bible.96 In November 1992, more than three years 
after the initial letter, the assistant secretary for the Office for Civil 
Rights responded, “granting” the exemption.97 
If the institution does not respond to a request for additional 
information within a few months, the Department of Education 
sends a second letter indicating that if the Department does not 
receive a response with additional information within thirty days, it 
will assume that the organization no longer seeks the exemption. For 
example, the University of Dallas sent an exemption letter in 
October 1976.98 On May 31, 1985, the Department requested 
additional information regarding religious tenets that conflict with 
the application of Title IX.99 The Department sent a second request 
for additional information on July 18, 1985, informing the 
University that if it did not respond within thirty days, the 
Department would assume that the University no longer required a 
religious exemption.100 On September 20, 1985, the Office for Civil 
Rights again wrote the University of Dallas informing them that the 
 
 95.  Letter from Robert A. Smallwood, Reg’l Civil Rights Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to 
Milo E. Thompson, Jr., President, Baptist Bible Coll. & Seminary, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(Nov. 10, 1988), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/baptist-
bible-college-and-seminary-response-11101988.pdf. 
 96.  Letter from Milo Thompson, Jr., President, Baptist Bible Coll. & Seminary, to 
Robert A. Smallwood, Reg’l Civil Rights Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 
(Jan. 26, 1989), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/baptist-
bible-college-and-seminary-request-01261989.pdf. 
 97.  Letter from Michael L. Williams, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Milo E. Thompson, President, Baptist Bible Coll. & Seminary, U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (Nov. 2, 1992), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/ 
baptist-bible-college-and-seminary-response-11021992.pdf. 
 98.  Letter from Sybil Novinski, Assoc. Acad. Dean & Registrar, Univ. of Dall., to 
Albert P. Hamlin, Chairperson, Title IX Test Grp., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health, Educ. & Welfare, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Oct. 6, 1976), https://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/university-of-dallas-request-10061976.pdf. 
 99.  Letter from James M. Littlejohn to Frederick T. Cioffi, Acting Dir., Policy & Enf’t 
Serv., Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Robert F. Sassen, President, Univ. of 
Dall., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 20, 1985), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/university-of-dallas-response-09201985.pdf. 
 100.  Id. 
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Department had closed the University’s file, assuming that it no 
longer required an exemption.101 
2. Requests for additional information 
 When requesting additional information regarding whether an 
institution’s religious tenets conflict with Title IX (as the 
Department did with the University of Dallas), the Singleton Memo, 
another internal memorandum within the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), asserts that OCR 
“cannot question what institution representatives claim as their 
beliefs” and can question only policies based on those beliefs “where 
one tenet clearly contradicts another.”102 Although the guidelines 
permit staff to check citations to scripture, the guidelines clarify that 
“[u]nder no circumstances should OCR appear to be interpreting 
the Bible.”103 Similarly, staff should accept general explanations of 
tenets regarding marital and parental status.104 In the course of its 
investigation into a Title IX complaint against such an institution, 
OCR may request an explanation of how religious tenets conflict 
with the requirements of Title IX from a religious leader.105 
When requesting additional information regarding whether an 
institution is controlled by a religious organization, the Department 
of Education’s guidelines also require that the Department not 
conduct an independent investigation into whether an institution is 
“controlled by” a religious organization. On the contrary, the 
Department of Education “accept[s] as fact that an institution is 
controlled by a religious organization where the specific organization 
is named even when no information is provided on how that 
organization controls the institution.”106 The Department of 
Education grants an exemption if an institution submits a request 
with “a statement by the highest ranking official of the institution, 
 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Memorandum from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. 
Dep’t of Educ., to Reg’l Civil Rights Directors, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. 3 (Feb. 19, 1985), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/singleton-memo-19850219.pdf. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
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identifying the religious organization that controls the educational 
institution and specifying the provisions of Title IX or its regulations 
that conflict with the tenets of the religious organization.”107 Control 
can be proven in a variety of ways, including “[a] doctrinal statement 
with the notation that specific members of the institution 
community must espouse a personal belief in the religion or 
doctrinal statement.”108 
Although no institution has ever been denied federal funds under 
Title IX, implicit in the Department’s letter-writing process is the 
threat that if a school does not adequately demonstrate its 
exemption, federal funding will be revoked. Instead, challenges to 
whether an institution qualifies for the religious exemption should 
come through the courts, the branch of government tasked with 
interpreting the language of statues in cases and controversies. 
D. Constitutional Concerns 
In addition to violating the text of Title IX, conducting an 
inquiry into the beliefs or governance of a religious institution 
presents a variety of constitutional concerns, as alluded to by 
President Oaks in 1975. The automatic statutory language of the 
Title IX religious exemption reflected a compromise made in 
Congress to push forward desirable civil rights legislation while still 
“leav[ing] religion alone,” in the words of Professor Esbeck.109 
Creating a regulatory procedure by which an institution must prove 
its eligibility to claim the exemption restricts free exercise and 
impermissibly entangles church and state. 
First, the regulations likely violate the church autonomy 
doctrine. The church autonomy doctrine is rooted in both the Free 
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause110 and “provides that 
religious communities should have autonomy, or independence, 
from the government in the formulation of their beliefs and faith, 
their organizational structure, and the whole range of policies and 
 
 107.  Exemptions from Title IX, supra note 89. 
 108.  Memorandum from William L. Smith, supra note 89, at 2 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 109.  Esbeck, supra note 3, at 378. 
 110.  Douglas Laycock, Church Autonomy Revisited, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 
253 (2009). 
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practices that the organization adopts to conduct, or structure its 
operations.”111 Thus, the essence of church autonomy is that a 
religious organization should be independent in how it manages its 
affairs. Professor Laycock has noted that a religious institution “can 
make out a good church autonomy claim simply by saying that this is 
internal to the church. This is our business; it is none of 
your business.”112  
The Title IX regulations infringe on church autonomy because 
they require the Department of Education to be involved in the 
business of a church, assessing both its hierarchical structure and its 
beliefs. The “controlled by” provision requires the Department of 
Education to evaluate matters of church governance, including how 
centralized a religious organization is. The religious tenets provision 
requires the Department of Education to, at the very least, 
document the beliefs of a religious organization and evaluate 
whether those religious tenets justify exemption from certain 
provisions of Title IX. This procedure inserts the government into 
how a religious organization handles internal affairs, such as how to 
manage religious educational institutions, and thus violates the 
church autonomy doctrine. 
In addition to infringing on church autonomy, the regulatory 
letter-writing procedure also restricts Free Exercise. As the Supreme 
Court has noted on several occasions, “[t]he Free Exercise Clause 
‘protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment.’”113 
Although there are several other exemptions to Title IX, the 
Department of Education acknowledges that “[n]o similar process 
exists in the regulations for any other exemption.”114 A “policy [that] 
expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by 
disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their 
religious character . . . triggers the most exacting scrutiny.”115 
Further, “when the State conditions a benefit in this way . . . the 
 
 111.  W. COLE DURHAM & ROBERT SMITH, 1 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE 
LAW § 5:1, (2017). 
 112.  Laycock, supra note 110, at 254. 
 113.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 
(2017) (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
542 (1993)). 
 114.  See Exemptions from Title IX, supra note 89. 
 115.  Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2021. 
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State has punished the free exercise of religion.”116 Thus, requiring 
religious organizations to go through an administrative procedure to 
be exempt when nonreligious groups are automatically exempt 
threatens Free Exercise. 
In addition, if exemption letters were ever denied by the 
Department, this could further restrict Free Exercise. The automatic 
language of the exemption guarantees that an institution will not be 
required to comply with elements of Title IX that conflict with its 
religious tenets. If the exemption is not automatic, but conditional, 
the Department may deny an exemption if it decides that a religious 
tenet does not conflict with Title IX, even if the religion says that it 
does. This situation would force an institution to choose between 
exercising its religion and complying with federal requirements. 
Although some may see this process as a way to weed out insincere 
claims of religious affiliation by those who seek to avoid Title IX 
compliance, that is not what the requirements of the religious 
exemption do. The requirements of the Title IX religious exemption 
are not designed to measure sincerity—they assess organizational 
control and the application of religious tenets. Thus, if the 
Department decided to exercise its discretion to deny religious 
exemptions, it could further restrict Free Exercise.  
The procedures created by subsection (b) also present 
Establishment Clause concerns by preferring certain kinds of 
religious organizations over others.  The Supreme Court has often 
noted that “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is 
that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over 
another,”117 that “[t]he government must be neutral when it comes 
to competition between sects,”118  and “that no State ‘can pass laws 
which aid one religion’ or that ‘prefer one religion over another.’”119  
Subsection (b) crosses this line by giving the Department of 
Education discretion to inquire into the level of institutional control 
a religious group has over an educational institution. This is similar 
to the statute the Supreme Court struck down in Larson v. Valente.120 
 
 116.  Id. at 2022. 
 117.  Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982). 
 118.  Id. at 246 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952)). 
 119.  Id. (quoting Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)). 
 120.  See id. at 255. 
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There, the Court held that a statute imposing institutional 
requirements to qualify for a religious exemption that had the effect 
of disfavoring certain religions was in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.121 Here, the Department could also unintentionally favor 
more centralized religions over less centralized religions in 
compliance with the “controlled by” provision, thus violating the 
Establishment Clause be preferring some kinds of religious 
organizations over others. 
In sum, subsection (b) of the regulations violate both the text of 
Title IX and potentially the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
by creating a regulatory procedure that gives the Department of 
Education discretion to grant or deny religious exemptions. To avoid 
constitutional conflicts, the regulations should be read as a courtesy 
rather than a requirement. 
IV. CHANGES IN ADMINISTRATION OF THE RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTION, 2014–2016 
Changes in the administration of the Title IX religious 
exemption from 2014–2016 illustrate the drawbacks of reading 
subsection (b) of the regulations as a requirement rather than a 
courtesy. From 2014 to 2016, the Department engaged in a 
procedural change in how it assessed exemption letters that 
coincided with a policy change. The policy change expanded Title IX 
to include nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and 
gender identity,122 resulting in many more religious exemption 
requests than any time since the earliest history of the exemption.123 
On February 22, 2017, the Department reversed this policy, 
removing previous guidance to the contrary from the Department of 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  See, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., QUESTIONS AND 
ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf. 
 123.  According to publicly available information, ninety-nine schools requested 
exemptions from the Department of Education’s changed definition of sex from 2014 to 
2016. By counting letters on the Department of Education’s website, I found ninety-nine 
requests for exemption from nondiscrimination provisions regarding sexual orientation and 
gender identity. See Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016, supra note 64. 
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Education’s website.124 Although this change in policy has, in effect, 
made these requests moot, the manner in which the Department 
handled these requests is what is of concern here, not the substance 
of the policy. In processing the onslaught of exemption letters from 
2014–2016, the Department overstepped its authority in violation of 
the text of Title IX. 
A. “Controlled by” Language from 2014–2016125 
 From 2014 to 2016, the Department asserted its authority under 
subsection (b) by examining control, a previously unquestioned 
element of the Title IX religious exemption. Prior to 2014, most 
requests for additional information pertained to whether the 
“application of [Title IX]” was “consistent with the religious tenets” 
of the organization.126 The Department only requested additional 
information on whether an institution was “controlled by a religious 
organization” if the institution had not provided information 
regarding the “controlled by” language.127 Since December 2014, all 
of the published requests for additional information were regarding 
the “controlled by” provision.128  
In its requests for additional information, the Department 
sought additional information on control even where it had 
previously determined that a school was exempt. As of December 31, 
 
 124.  Letter from Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., & T.E. Wheeler, II, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Colleagues, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www2
.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf; see also Press Release, 
U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos Issues Statement on New Title IX Guidance, U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC. (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-secretary-education-
betsy-devos-issues-statement-new-title-ix-guidance. 
 125.  Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Title IX Enforcement and Interpretation: The Winds of Change 
are Blowing, JDSUPRA (Dec. 29, 2016), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/title-ix-enfor 
cement-and-interpretation-43698/. 
 126.  See supra Section III.B. 
 127.  See generally Religious Exemptions Index Prior to 2009, supra note 64; Religious 
Exemptions Index 2009–2016, supra note 64; Assurance of Compliance with Title IX of 
Education Amendments of 1972, 42 Fed. Reg. 15141, 15142–43 (Mar. 18, 1977); 
Memorandum from William L. Smith, supra note 89. 
 128.  See Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016, supra note 64. I read the requests for 
additional information in the letters pre-dating 2014, and they did not include requests for 
additional information about control unless no information was provided in the initial letter. 
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2016, when the publication of religious exemption letters seems to 
have ended,129 248 religious schools have been granted religious 
exemptions from Title IX by the Department of Education.130 
Ninety-nine schools have sent exemption letters regarding sexual 
orientation and gender identity since 2013.131 Twenty-three schools 
have not received a final response.132 The Department of Education 
requested additional information from nine schools regarding 
control.133 Four of those nine schools had been previously deemed as 
exempt by the Department of Education.134 Five of the nine schools 
received letters acknowledging their exemption after they sent 
additional information.135 All nine schools provided information in 
their initial letters that was sufficient to meet the control test as 
published in the Federal Register.136 
 
 129.  When I first began researching this topic in the summer of 2016, the link indicated 
that it included exemption letters from 2009–present. Now, the same link includes letters from 
2009–2016, and there is no link for letters after December 2016. Therefore, I assume that the 
Department has, at least temporarily, decided to stop publishing exemption letters. See 
generally Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016, supra note 64. 
 130.  OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INSTITUTIONS CURRENTLY 
HOLDING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION, https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-
rel-exempt/rel-exempt-approved-and-pending.xlsx (last updated Dec. 31, 2016) [hereinafter 
INSTITUTIONS CURRENTLY HOLDING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION]. 
 131.  See Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016, supra note 64. 
 132.  See generally INSTITUTIONS CURRENTLY HOLDING RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION, supra 
note 130. I read through the exemption letters and responses to determine which schools had 
not received a response. 
 133.  See Religious Exemptions Index 2009–2016, supra note 64. These nine schools are: 
(1) Biola University, (2) Colorado Christian University, (3) Criswell College, (4) Indiana 
Wesleyan University, (5) Missouri Baptist University, (6) Southeastern University, (7) The 
Masters College for Christ and Scripture, (8) Trinity Baptist College, and (9) the University of 
Dallas. See id. I read through the exemption letters and responses to determine which schools 
had not received a response. 
 134.  Id. These four schools are: (1) Biola University, (2) Colorado Christian University, 
(3) Indiana Wesleyan University, and (4) Missouri Baptist University. See id. I read through the 
exemption letters before 2009 to determine which schools had already been considered 
exempt, and thus, by implication, had satisfied the control test in the past. 
 135.  Id. The four schools that are still awaiting a final response from the Department of 
Education are: (1) Arlington Baptist College, (2) The Masters College for Christ and 
Scripture, (3) Trinity Baptist College, and (4) the University of Dallas. See id. I read through 
the exemption letters and responses to determine which schools had received both a request 
for additional information and a response acknowledging the exemption. 
 136.  Each of the schools indicated in their request letters that they either required 
faculty to adhere to a statement of faith or that their official documents (bylaws, mission 
statements, etc.) espouse a particular faith, in accordance with part three of the published 
control test. See id. 
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These requests for additional information demonstrate the 
dangers of subsection (b) of the regulation. First, instead of being 
automatic as written in the statute, these schools’ exemptions were 
contingent upon the Department’s discretion. Second, the standards 
the Department used in assessing were unclear. Several schools 
received requests for additional information even where the provided 
information would previously have been deemed sufficient under the 
Department’s published memoranda. Third, when the Department 
did not respond, especially after a school provided the requested 
additional information, schools were faced with uncertainty 
regarding their exempt status and whether they would continue to 
be eligible for federal funding. 
B. Case Study: Indiana Wesleyan 
The experience of Indiana Wesleyan University provides an 
example of the problems presented by the Department’s 
administrative changes from 2014 to 2016. Indiana Wesleyan 
University sent an exemption letter on March 18, 2016, regarding 
the new guidelines pertaining to sexual orientation and gender 
identity.137 In its letter, Indiana Wesleyan stated that it was “founded 
by the Wesleyan Church . . . and remains an institution of The 
Wesleyan Church to this day.”138 It articulated a list of seven religious 
tenets that conflict with the guidelines regarding sexual orientation 
and gender identity.139 These disclosures comply with the 
requirements of the regulation because they identify the religious 
organization that controls the educational institution and specify the 
provisions of Title IX or its regulations that conflict with the tenets 
of the religious organization.140 This information also satisfies the 
guidelines in the Singleton Memo because “the specific organization 
is named” and would have been sufficient “even [if] no 
 
 137.  Letter from David Wright, President, Ind. Wesleyan Univ., to Catherine Lhamon, 
Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Mar. 18, 
2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/indiana-wesleyan-
university-request-03182016.pdf. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  34 C.F.R. § 106.12 (2017); Assurance of Compliance with Title IX of Education 
Amendments of 1972, 42 Fed. Reg. 15141, 15142–43 (Mar. 18, 1977). 
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information  [were] provided on how that organization controls 
the  institution.”141  
In addition, the Department already acknowledged Indiana 
Wesleyan’s exemption to Title IX’s provision regarding pregnancy 
outside of marriage, and thus the University had been deemed to be 
controlled by a religious organization in the past.142 When Indiana 
Wesleyan, known at the time as Marion College,143 previously wrote 
an exemption letter on June 28, 1976, it stated that it could not 
comply with sections of Title IX that conflicted with “the general 
rules of The Wesleyan Church by which Marion College is 
controlled.”144 It provided no additional information regarding 
control.145 In response, the Department of Education wrote that the 
president of the college had “supplied information in his request 
letter that establishes that the institution is controlled by a religious 
organization.”146 Although the organizational structures of many 
religious colleges and universities have changed in the past forty 
years, in its most recent letter Indiana Wesleyan provided 
information that reflected its organizational structure had not 
changed, and it remains part of the Wesleyan Church.147 
Indeed, Indiana Wesleyan arguably provided more information 
regarding control in its 2016 request148 than in its 1976 request,149 
 
 141.  Memorandum from Harry M. Singleton, supra note 102. 
 142.  Letter from Woodrow Goodman, President, Marion Coll., to Peter E. Homes, Dir., 
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (June 28, 1976), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/indiana-wesleyan-unviers 
ity-request-06281976.pdf. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Letter from Harry M. Singleton, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to James P. Hill, Jr., President, Marion Coll., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 13, 1985), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/indiana-wesleyan-unviers 
ity-response-09131985.pdf. 
 147.  See Letter from David Wright, supra note 137. 
 148.  In its original letter, Wesleyan University wrote: “IWU was founded by The 
Wesleyan Church to provide higher education within a Christian environment for Wesleyan 
youth, and remains an institution of the Wesleyan Church to this day.” Id. That sentence 
concluded with footnote citations to pages on Indiana Wesleyan’s website and The Wesleyan 
Church website that support those assertions. Id. 
 149.  Wesleyan University’s (Marion College) 1976 request included only the phrase “the 
Wesleyan Church by which Marion College is controlled.” Letter from Woodrow Goodman, 
supra note 142. 
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but the Department of Education requested additional information 
regarding control from Indiana Wesleyan on May 13, 2016.150 On 
June 2, 2016, Indiana Wesleyan sent another letter to the 
Department with the requested additional information.151 As of 
December 31, 2016, the Department of Education had not 
responded to Indiana Wesleyan’s additional information. 
 As the example of Indiana Wesleyan demonstrates, these requests 
for additional information exceeded the Department’s authority by 
subjecting the Title IX religious exemption to arbitrary 
administrative discretion. The Department’s enigmatic and delayed 
responses seemed to be a delaying tactic in an attempt to assert 
authority and restrict the religious exemption. Many universities 
were in a state of limbo, uncertain whether they would be deprived 
of substantial funding. If the Department continues to exercise 
authority to grant or deny religious exemptions under subsection 
(b), it may continue to act in an arbitrary manner, granting 
exemptions to some and ignoring or requesting additional 
information from others with little apparent justification. This 
violates the statutory language and subsection (a) of the regulation, 
and creates conflict with the First Amendment. Although a change in 
substantive policy from one presidential administration to another 
resolved the underlying substantive question, the problematic 
procedural precedents established by the Department’s 
actions  remain.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The language of the Title IX religious exemption reflects a 
congressional compromise that calls for automatic exemption of 
qualifying educational institutions. One of the reasons why Title IX 
has been effective in promoting gender equality in education is 
 
 150.  Letter from Seth M. Galanter, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil 
Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to David Wright, President, Ind. Wesleyan Univ., U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (May 13, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/ 
indiana-wesleyan-university-response-05132016.pdf. 
 151.  Letter from David Wright, President, Ind. Wesleyan Univ., to Seth M. Galanter, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. (June 2, 2016), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/t9-rel-exempt/ 
indiana-wesleyan-university-request-06022016.pdf?src=preview. 
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because of its religious exemption, which allows the country’s long-
standing tradition of religious education to continue while still 
advancing gender equality.  
Going forward, the Department of Education should apply the 
Title IX religious exemption as written. Recognizing that exemptions 
are automatically granted to qualifying institutions by statute and 
that it has no authority to grant or deny exemptions, the 
Department of Education should view the letter writing process as a 
courtesy, not a requirement. This is in harmony with the statutory 
text and avoids potential First Amendment conflicts.  
Statutory religious exemptions have played a valuable role in 
American history, promoting desirable social change while providing 
accommodations for religious dissenters. Restricting statutory 
religious exemptions will not further civil rights but will instead 
create a new class of people who feel they are oppressed by the 
government because of their beliefs. Instead, government should 
continue to enact and implement automatic religious exemptions as 
they strive to create liberty and justice for all. 
Elise S. Faust* 
  
 
 *  J.D. candidate, April 2018, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
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